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Discussione: Yom Kippur 1973

  1. #1
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    Sep 2007

    Yom Kippur 1973

    ciao a tutti.....

    Oggi vi raconto di una guerra, molto breve, dai più dimenticata.

    Nel mese di ottobre 1973 le forze armate di Siria e Egitto (appoggiate da contingenti di altri paesi arabi quali Kuwait, Marocco, Libia, Iraq, ecc.) attaccarono simultaneamente lungo il canale di Suez (gli Egiziani, il confine era lì con il Sinai sotto controllo Israeliano) e sulle alture del Golan i Siriani.
    La pianificazione fu ben curata (per gli standard degli eserciti arabi di allora) e inizialmente la sorpresa riuscì.
    Fu un test che permise ai sovietici di testare gli ultimi ritrovati in fatto di sistemi d'arma ad esempio il missile controcarro filoguidato Sagger che, usato da team di tre uomini, fece strage di carri israeliani nei primi giorni di combattimento (soprattuto nella zona del Sinai) ed anche se con meno successo il carro di costruzione sovietica T62 (cannone ad anima liscia da 115 mm) che aveva un ottimo pezzo (studiato per la lotta controcarro) ma con una serie di sistemi di puntamento (e di addestramento) non all'altezza dei mezzi in dotazione a Tsal (Esercito israeliano).
    Altra cosa abbastanza nota e che, dopo l'effetto sorpresa iniziale, una volta entrata a regime la mobilitazione israeliana (che è mutuata da quella svizzera per chi non lo sapesse) e con un bel po' di mezzi "made in USA" arrivati dalle dotazioni della 7^ armata USA in Germania Occidentale, la situazione si capovolse con l'esercito siriano messo in situazione di non nuocere (e con avanguardie israeliane in avvicinamento a Damasco) e con gli egiziani virtualmente distrutti dopo i combattimenti a ovest del canale (Chinese farm) con Cairo a rischio di occupazione da parte delle forze di Tel Aviv.

    La parte meno nota è relativa al fatto che gli israeliani non erano molto convinti di fermarsi per trattare (si tratta meglio se occupi la capitale del tuo nemico) e che sembra avessero fatto, inizialmente, "orecchie da mercante". L'URSS decise di forzare i tempi mettendo in allerta le proprie forze armate (in Europa orientale), preparando all'azione le sue 7 (!!!) divisioni aereotrasportate una delle quali veniva ridislocata presso l'aereoporto di Belgrado (alla faccia del non allineato Tito).

    Qui informazioni sul Sagger
    http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land ... sagger.htm

    Qui una spolverata sul T62
    http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... a/t-62.htm

    E di seguito un'analisi in inglese sui risvolti internazionali relativi al conflitto:

    Effects-Based Operations: The Yom Kippur War Case Study
    Steven M. Beres, Shannon M. Corey, Eric S. Jaffe, and Jonathan E. Tarter
    Evidence Based Research, Inc.
    1595 Spring Hill Rd.
    Vienna, VA 22182
    The end of the Cold War and rise of the Information Age challenged the United States to
    re-examine its strategic approach to military and political conflicts. No longer fearful of
    a nuclear showdown with Moscow and armed with new sophisticated technology, the
    United States began to prepare to fight wars of a lesser scope than they had previously
    One thing that did not change about the United States approach to military planning was
    the fundamental role reserved for diplomacy and operations other than war (OOTW) in
    strategic planning. These operations are now commonly referred to as effects-based
    operations, or EBO. USJFCOM defines EBO as, "A process for obtaining a desired
    strategic outcome or "effect" on the enemy, through the synergistic, multiplicative, and
    cumulative application of the full range of military and nonmilitary capabilities at the
    tactical, operational, and strategic levels." While the term effects-based operation is
    new, the concept`s logic has been used by military planners for centuries. After all, if
    military operations are planned by rational actors, what operation is not effects-based?
    Military planners should theoretically always intend to achieve positive results. Even
    military operations that the Clausewitzian trinity would label as irrational – the
    primordial violence provoked by hatred and enmity – are arguably effects-based, as they
    often intend to devastate or demoralize the enemy.
    The importance of effects-based operations as a viable military concept is quickly
    becoming recognized by DoD planners. This is, perhaps, in part because the concept is
    new in name only. In 1973, the Nixon administrations` use of U.S. political and military
    forces on October 23rd – 24th successfully shaped Soviet behavior and thus provides an
    excellent example of a successful modern day effects-based campaign. This paper is a
    case study of American efforts at the height of tension between the superpowers during
    the Yom Kippur War. It will examine the important aspects of effects-based operations
    using the DIME construct as a tool for assessment.
    Effects-based operations (EBO) is not a new concept. Strategic leaders have used EBO`s
    principles of war-planning to solve foreign policy crises without explicitly
    acknowledging it as a guiding principle. The diplomatic, information, military and
    economic (DIME) construct has been chosen to analyze the 1973 Yom Kippur War
    because it effectively organizes and classifies the chronological steps of a historical
    event, an essential element to assessing any EBO.
    The 1973 Yom Kippur War lends itself to analysis as an EBO because it highlights the
    threat of nuclear war. The relevant actors knew the likely outcome of the application of
    nuclear forces – mutually assured destruction. Because the potential outcome was so
    extreme, each state actor made strategic moves that they knew the other side would see
    clearly and were less likely to misinterpret. The nuclear dimension exaggerated the
    actions of each actor, thus making their actions more easily discernible than other cases
    of diplomacy.1 While not all decisions were recorded, there are some declassified
    documents that describe the high-level negotiations that occurred during the crisis.
    There is no real consensus on a definition for effects-based operations. For the purposes
    of this paper, the definition will combine parts of the definitions used by U.S. Joint
    Forces Command and Ed Smith in Effects Based Operations. EBO, then, is a process for
    obtaining a desired strategic outcome or "effect" on the enemy by shaping the behavior of
    Historical Background
    The story of the 1973 Middle East crisis began with the Six-Day War. On June 5, 1967,
    Israel launched a preemptive air assault near the Sinai Peninsula, crippling Egypt`s air
    force. In six days, Israel wrested control of the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, captured
    Jerusalem's Old City from Jordan and gained the strategic Golan Heights from Syria.
    The Suez Canal was also closed by the war. Israel declared that it would not give up
    control of Jerusalem and the other captured territories until significant progress was made
    in Arab-Israeli relations. These captured areas became known as the occupied territories.
    The Security Council passed UN Resolution 242 calling for Israeli withdrawal. Both
    sides, however, declared their intent to continue fighting and the region remained
    volatile. The United States sided with Israel while the Soviet Union supported Arab
    During the 1960s and early 1970s, the Arabs and Israelis engaged in sporadic fighting.
    President Nasser of Egypt died in 1970 and was succeeded by Anwar Sadat, who vowed
    to fight Israel and win back the territories lost in 1967. In 1973, the Arab states believed
    that their concerns were being ignored. On October 6, 1973, on the Jewish holy day of
    Yom Kippur, Egypt and Syria, led by Sadat, staged a two-pronged assault on Israel.
    After three weeks of fighting, and after the U.S. dramatically re-supplied the Israel
    Defense Forces (IDF) with ammunition, the Israelis managed to push the Arab forces
    back beyond the original line.
    Meanwhile, the two superpowers continued their geopolitical machinations while the
    Middle East remained embroiled in conflict and tension. By the 1970s, the two
    superpowers had developed a close friendship and were keenly aware of each others`
    actions. During the late 1960's, the United States began to pursue a policy of détente
    which resulted in a general reduction in the tension between the Soviet Union and the
    United States. U.S. President Richard Nixon chose to pursue detente as a proactive
    engagement with communist governments rather than the previous policy of containment.
    U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger played a major role in the development of this
    1 The analysis of the case study is restricted to the higher level decisions that were made with consequences
    that could be assessed and related to a previous action or event.
    2 Joint Forces Command and Ed Smith, Effects Based Operations, CCRP: 2002.
    Kissinger, the Double-Cross Risk, and Hostilities
    Hoping to find a solution to the 1973 war, Henry Kissinger flew to Moscow on Oct. 20th
    and agreed with the Soviets to seek a cease-fire in the region. On October 22nd, the
    secretary made a visit to Israel for a private meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Golda
    Meir and her Cabinet in an attempt to persuade Israel to accept the terms of the cease-fire
    that had been negotiated between the Soviets and the U.S. Israel resisted the agreement
    because they refused to forgo destruction of the Egyptian Third Army. The IDF had
    encircled the Third Army on the Sinai, and they did not necessarily desire to negotiate
    with Egypt. No changes were allowed to be made in the language of the agreement.
    Speculation on what actually happened during Kissinger`s talks with the Israeli Cabinet
    varies. In the terms of the agreement, both sides called for a 12 hour deadline for
    implementation of a cease-fire. Some observers claim that Secretary Kissinger
    encouraged Israel to believe that the deadline was flexible and that Washington was
    prepared to let them finish the encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army. Other versions
    of the story claim that Kissinger put pressure on Meir and her advisers to strictly adhere
    to the agreement terms and that both the U.S. and Soviet Union opposed destruction of
    the Egyptian Army.3
    Kissinger departed Israel believing that the conflict was defused and that the war would
    end. When he landed in Washington on October 23rd, Israel seemed to be ignoring the
    cease-fire and instead had continued to encircle the Egyptian army. Soviet Premier
    Leonid Brezhnev sent a hotline message to President Nixon confirming that Moscow felt
    betrayed. He urged the U.S. to "move decisively to stop the violations," and implied that
    the U.S. might have collaborated in Israeli actions. When Kissinger learned that the
    Israelis had completed surrounding the Third Army after the cease-fire deadline, he
    reportedly exclaimed, "My God, the Soviets will think I double-crossed them. And in
    their shoes, who wouldn't?" 4
    The Crisis
    The crisis began on the morning of Oct. 24th. The Nixon administration had little time to
    formulate a complex plan to deal with the escalating crisis.5 Nixon convened the
    Washington Special Action Group (WSAG), which was a National Security Council
    committee designed to deal with serious crises. Participants in the meeting included
    Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, CIA Director
    William Colby, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Thomas Moorer, and Deputy
    National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft.
    When the WASG met on the morning of the 24th, Israel and Egypt were still fighting
    despite two U.N. Security Council resolutions calling for a cease-fire. Fighting had
    3 Barry M. Blechman and Douglas M. Hart, "Nuclear Weapons and the 1973 Middle East Crisis," The Use
    of Force: Third Edition, eds. Robert J. Art and Kenneth Waltz, the University Press of America: 1988. Pg.
    4 Quoted in ibid 310.
    5 Ibid 309.
    ceased in the north between Israel and Syria, but in the south, the IDF had encircled the
    entire Egyptian Third Army. The Israelis wanted to use the Third Army as a bargaining
    chip in future peace talks and would not bow to pressure from Washington to abide by a
    The Soviets moved quickly and prepared to intervene on the side of the beleaguered
    Egyptians. They realized that the Americans had raised the stakes by re-supplying the
    Israelis and were preparing to react accordingly. They took several military steps that
    they intended for the U.S. to pick up from their signals intelligence (SIGINT) networks.
    On March 24th, Moscow placed four airborne divisions on alert, which added to the three
    that had been alerted earlier that month. The Soviets has also set up an airborne command
    post in the southern Soviet Union. In addition, several air force units were alerted.
    Reports also indicated that at least one of the divisions and a squadron of transport planes
    had been moved from the Soviet Union to an airbase in Yugoslavia. The Soviets also had
    seven amphibious warfare craft with naval infantry deployed in the Mediterranean. With
    some 40,000 combat troops6 ready for action, the Soviets posed a serious threat to the
    military balance on the Sinai.
    All of these military alerts caused an increase in Soviet communications, which was
    picked up by the U.S. SIGINT collection system, thus informing Washington of
    Moscow's actions. The Soviets knew this, and deliberately wanted these alerts to send a
    clear signal to the U.S.
    The Soviet threat was amplified by the risk of a nuclear attack. The U.S. intelligence
    community had been tracking a Soviet ship carrying radioactive material that had entered
    the Mediterranean Sea via the Bosporus Strait on Oct. 22nd. Three days later, it docked at
    Port Said at the Mediterranean entrance to the Suez Canal. Unconfirmed rumors lead to
    speculation that the radioactive material consisted of nuclear warheads. The warheads
    were believed to be sent to a brigade of Soviet SCUD missiles previously deployed
    outside of Cairo.7
    On Oct. 24th, President Anwar Sadat appealed to the U.S. and the Soviet Union to
    establish a joint peacekeeping force, a move that Washington was absolutely unwilling to
    accept. President Nixon`s response, in the form of a note drafted by Kissinger was blunt:
    "Should the two great nuclear powers be called upon to provide force, it would introduce
    an extremely dangerous potential for great-power rivalry in the area."8
    At the same time, Washington feared unilateral military action by the Soviets. Not only
    were the Soviets alerting their forces, but Brezhnev stated in his response to Sadat`s
    request that the Soviet Union would be forced to take unilateral action to impose a ceasefire
    if the United States was unwilling to participate in a joint mission.
    6 Ibid 311.
    7 Ibid.
    8 Quoted in ibid 312.
    After convening a session of the WASG, Nixon ordered a military response to send the
    message to the Soviets that their unilateral action would not be tolerated. By midnight on
    Oct. 25th, he ordered the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to raise the alert of U.S.
    forces to Defense Condition 3 (DEFCON III).9 In addition, more than 50 B-52 strategic
    bombers were ordered to move from their base in Guam to the continental United States,
    placing them closer to the crisis zone. Airborne tankers, which provided the lifeline for
    long range strategic bombing missions, were dispersed and prepared for action. In
    another show of force, Nixon ordered the carrier USS John F. Kennedy into the
    Mediterranean. The 82nd Airborne Division was put on alert and told to be ready to
    deploy by 6:00 a.m. on the 25th.
    The hope was that these alerts would deliver a message to the Soviets. Washington never
    publicly announced the alerts, but instead counted on Soviet SIGINT networks to
    intercept the increased signals traffic they generated. The U.S. used communications and
    other signals intelligence as the major way to transmit the threat designed to prevent a
    Soviet intervention in the Sinai.10
    The U.S. chose to use diplomatic means to threaten the Soviet Union with nuclear action.
    Washington responded to Brezhnev`s note with a reply given to U.N. Ambassador
    Anatoly Dobrynin early on the 25th. "We must view your suggestions of unilateral action
    as a matter of gravest concern, involving incalculable consequences," the note read.11 It
    then made reference to the 1973 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
    "In the spirit of our agreements, this is the time for acting not unilaterally, but in harmony
    and with cool heads." The note then repeated the possibility of "incalculable
    consequences" if the Soviets intervened unilaterally.
    Kissinger again alluded to the threat of nuclear war during a press conference at noon on
    the 25th at the State Dept. "We possess, each of us, nuclear arsenals capable of
    annihilating humanity. We, both of us, have a special duty to see to it that confrontations
    are kept within bounds that do not threaten civilized life."12 Kissinger`s statement, the
    response to Brezhnev`s note, and the DEFCON III status heightening demonstrated to the
    Soviets that the U.S. was committed to preserving its strategic objectives in the Middle
    The U.S. actions proved to be successful. The crisis was over within hours of Kissinger`s
    press conference. The Soviet ambassador to the U.N. was ordered to halt his actions to
    create a bilateral peacekeeping mission on the Sinai and an international peacekeeping
    force, which did not include U.S. or Soviet peacekeepers, was ratified by the Security
    Council later on the 25th. Moscow, however, was allowed to deploy 70 observers to
    verify the cease-fire agreement. At the same time, the Third Army escaped destruction
    and the Soviets did not send forces to Egypt.
    9 There are five defense readiness conditions (DEFCONS). DEFCON 1 puts U.S. forces at maximum force
    readiness, i.e. a state of war.
    10 Blechman and Hart 317.
    11 Quoted in ibid 317.
    12 Quoted in ibid 317.
    U.S. Strategic Objectives
    The U.S. was willing to use the nuclear threat as a bargaining tool during the 1973
    Middle East crisis because the stakes were so high. Blechman and Hart argue that "a
    threat of nuclear war is credible only in certain situations – those in which the nation`s
    most important interests are evidently at stake."13 Nixon and Kissinger felt that the threat
    posed by Soviet unilateral action could undermine the delicate Cold War balance of
    power. President Nixon acknowledged the gravity of the situation when he remarked in
    the White House on Oct. 17th, 1973, "No one is more keenly aware of the stakes: oil and
    our strategic position."14
    It was important to Kissinger and Nixon to maintain the global perception of the United
    States as a superpower, especially in the wake of United States weakness demonstrated in
    Vietnam. Kissinger outlined the American position on Oct. 23rd during a staff meeting at
    the Dept. of State. "The judgment was that if another American-armed country were
    defeated by Soviet armed countries, the inevitable lessons that anybody around the world
    would have to draw, is to rely increasingly on the Soviet Union."15
    Kissinger also pointed out that an Egyptian victory would "undermine the position in the
    Middle East, even in countries that were not formally opposing us, such as Saudi Arabia
    and Jordan, if the radical Arab states [Egypt and Syria] supported by the Soviet Union
    scored a great victory over the Israelis."16
    Effects Based Operations: The DIME Construct
    Methods of EBO assessment are not well-established because the concept is relatively
    new.17 The diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME) model, however,
    provides a useful methodology. It is broad enough to encompass the dimensions of the
    established definition used in this paper. The DIME model serves as a relatively simple
    representation of actionable arenas.
    The DIME terms are defined as follows:
    â?¢ Diplomatic: Negotiation between nations though official channels.
    â?¢ Information: Knowledge of specific events or situations that has been gathered
    or received by communicating intelligence or news.
    â?¢ Military: Of or relating to the armed forces.
    13 Pg. 307
    14 Memorandum of Conversation, the White House, Oct. 17, 1973. Unclassified on Aug. 20, 2003. The
    document can be found at the National Security Archive. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv. Besides Kissinger and
    Nixon, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kenneth Rush, Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements;
    Director of Central Intelligence William Colby, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Thomas
    Moorer were in attendance.
    15 Henry Kissinger, "Secretary`s Staff Meeting," Oct. 23, 1973. Declassified on March 3, 1998. Available
    at the National Security Archive.
    16 Ibid.
    17 As noted earlier, EBO is not a new concept, only a newly-recognized concept.
    â?¢ Economic: Of or returning to the production, development, and management of a
    nation`s national wealth.
    This case study focuses on events that occurred between when Sadat delivered his letter
    to the U.N. at 3:00 p.m. on the 24th the end of the crisis on the 25th. This period focuses
    on the escalating and subsequently defused tension between the two superpowers. The
    timeline and sequencing of events is listed in figure 1.
    The American and Soviet response to Sadat`s letter were different. The reasons for this
    divergence were spelled out in Kissinger`s letter to Brezhnev. It stated, "should the two
    great nuclear powers be called upon to provide forces, it would introduce an extremely
    dangerous potential for great-power rivalry in the area."18 This stated intent is the basis of
    the US`s overall desired effect. The means for attaining the effect fell within the DIME
    The actions during the crisis can be broken down into seven major actions/reactions.
    These are outlined on the sequence of events in figure 1. These major actions/reactions
    1- Sadat proposed joint U.S./Soviet peacekeeping force (impetus for the escalation)
    2- USSR accepted Sadat's proposal
    3- U.S. rejected the proposal
    4- Brezhnev sent a note saying the Soviet Union would consider reacting
    5- U.S. raised alert level to DEFCON 3 and activated strategic forces.
    6- USSR signals intelligence networks picked up U.S. alert
    7- U.S. responded to Brezhnev`s note with a note to Amb. Dobrynin
    8- Kissinger held a press conference to tell the world about the crisis
    9- It was determined that a U.N. peacekeeping force will intervene excluding the
    major superpowers (U.S. and USSR)
    18 Quoted in Blechman and Hart 312.
    Figure 1: The DIME construct displayed over time
    The conflict in this case study was between the Soviet's and the American's different
    view of appropriate intervention in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The natural starting point of
    the conflict was when the U.S. declined Sadat`s request to become involved, because this
    was when the U.S. and USSR`s views of the level of superpower involvement diverged.
    Since this case study exclusively examined U.S. actions (as opposed to Soviet actions),
    Kissinger`s refusal of the joint force is where the analysis began. This action was
    characterized as a diplomatic action within the DIME model. There was no indication
    that this was intended to inform anyone other than national diplomats of the American
    stance on the situation. This action led to Brezhnev sending a note to Kissinger. This
    action/reaction cycle flowed throughout the analysis. The structure of the timeline was
    designed to illustrate a relationship between actions and reactions. This was a basic
    building block highlighted in Effects Based Operations.19
    As the cycle evolved, it became apparent how the environment -- diplomatic,
    information, and military -- proceeded from decision point (or action point) to decision
    point throughout the crisis. This case study focused on the two superpowers, and thus all
    19 Smith 207.
    other variables were treated as exogenous factors that played into the general
    environment. This is not to say that these third parties were not important, they in fact
    were a dimension of effects-based operations because they helped guide the options
    available to the decision makers. Third party involvement was so important that it was
    indeed the third party (the U.N.) that diffused the situation.
    In the context of this case study, the superpowers paid close attention to how their actions
    would be perceived in the court of global opinion. The perception among citizens of third
    party nations was discussed during the press conference held on the 25th. This was
    intended to send a message to the Soviets about the gravity of the situation, as
    demonstrated by Kissinger's reference to the superpowers' nuclear arsenals.
    The categorization of the actions into their respective areas as denoted by the DIME
    concept was determined by the established definitions. Some actions could have been
    binned into two or more categories. For example, one could argue that the U.S. alert was
    issued to send a message to the Soviets rather than to increase force readiness. It can be
    assumed that the Soviets would know about the alert on or about the same time the U.S.
    forces were notified. This in effect sent the message to the Soviets that the U.S. was very
    serious about the potential of armed conflict. For the purposes of this case study,
    however, each event was binned in only one DIME category.
    The final analysis of this case study reveals some interesting phenomena. Breaking down
    the actions into a structure similar to a decision tree, one realizes that two actions often
    occur simultaneously. Note the correlation between the military actions and the
    diplomatic actions. We speculate that due to the potential for a rapid escalation to the use
    of nuclear force, each country wanted to demonstrate seriousness but allow for a clear
    path toward diplomatic resolution. This allowed for a leader to "opt out" with ease.
    Final Comments:
    This case study of effects-based operations assists in understanding the concepts
    associated with the theory. This understanding is necessary to think through the
    action/reaction sequences that enable decision makers to think beyond the traditional
    means of achieving desired effects and in essence utilizing every conceivable method for
    creating favorable situations and achieving desired effects.
    The Middle East crisis of 1973 was a particularly good example of U.S. policy makers
    planning and making their decisions with an "effects-based mindset." They had an
    objective in mind and were willing to employ a variety of methods to achieve that
    objective, rather than incessantly pursuing one type of method (one of the elements of

    ed infine l'estratto relativo alle forze aviotrasportate sovietiche:
    The Soviets placed seven airborne divisions on alert and airlift was marshalled to transport them to the Middle East. An airborne command post was set up in the southern Soviet Union. Several air force units were also alerted. "Reports also indicated that at least one of the divisions and a squadron of transport planes had been moved from the Soviet Union to an airbase in Yugoslavia".

    E' lungo, me ne rendo conto, spero che interessi

    Il mio avatar è la foto di Arthur Kueger, Feldwebel ferito a Stalingrado, mancato nel gennaio 2009

  2. #2
    Utente registrato
    Data Registrazione
    Mar 2007

    Re: Yom Kippur 1973


  3. #3
    Data Registrazione
    Nov 2007

    Re: Yom Kippur 1973

    Interessante lettura che conoscevo in parte.. grazie per averla rispolverata..
    Gigi "Viper 4"

    "...Non mi sento colpevole.. Ho fatto il mio lavoro senza fare del male a nessuno.. Non ho sparato un solo colpo durante tutta la guerra.. Non rimpiango niente.. Ho fatto il mio dovere di soldato come milioni di altri Tedeschi..." - Rochus Misch dal libro L'ultimo

  4. #4
    Moderatore L'avatar di Paolo Marzetti
    Data Registrazione
    Nov 2005
    Italia-New Zealand

    Re: Yom Kippur 1973

    E' l'unica volta che le forze armate egiziane, hanno fatto tremare gli israeliani
    applicando alla lettera la sorpresa.Poi le cose sono andate diversamente, ma
    grazie solamente alla differente tecnologia delle armi usate dagli israeliani. PaoloM

  5. #5
    Utente registrato L'avatar di Andrea58
    Data Registrazione
    Mar 2008

    Re: Yom Kippur 1973

    Forse è proprio da questa guerra di cui le peggiori conseguenze furono pagate dagli egiziani che nacque da parte di questi la volontà* di raggiungere un modus vivendi con Israele che dura se non sbaglio da allora con vantaggio reciproco.
    Homo homini lupus. Draco dormiens nunquam titillandus
    lo spirito di Cesare, vagante in cerca di vendetta, con al suo fianco Ate uscita infocata dall'inferno, entro questi confini con voce di monarca griderà "Sterminio", e scioglierà i mastini della guerra, così che questa infame impresa ammorberà la terra col puzzo delle carogne umane gementi per la sepoltura.

  6. #6
    Utente registrato
    Data Registrazione
    Sep 2007

    Re: Yom Kippur 1973

    Probabilmente nell'occasione di quel conflitto mi "partì l'embolo" per le "robe di guerra".
    Avevo 6 anni e avevo iniziato da poco la scuola (1^ elementare) e mi ricordo i telegiornali abbastanza preoccupati (chissa se si ritrovano i filmati dei tg di quell'epoca), e ricordo bene lo stupore dei miei nel vedere un bimbo assorbito dalla tg con i servizi di guerra (come se stessero trasmettendo Bugs Bunny)

    Il mio avatar è la foto di Arthur Kueger, Feldwebel ferito a Stalingrado, mancato nel gennaio 2009

  7. #7
    Utente registrato L'avatar di kanister
    Data Registrazione
    Aug 2007

    Re: Yom Kippur 1973

    Ciao, per me sono dei ricordi ancora vividi nella memoria, forse dipenderà* dal fatto che avevo già* seguito con lo stesso interesse le guerre del 1956 e del 1967, Solo quella del 1948 me l'ero persa, ma solo perchè troppo giovane e non ancora capace di intendere e di volere.
    Comunque, intriso di racconti delle guerre nel deserto nel 1940-42, che gli israeliani arrivassero a tagliare le linee egiziane per me era quasi una certezza, ed infatti così avvenne.
    Non vediamo la storia per come è ma per come siamo.

  8. #8
    Utente registrato
    Data Registrazione
    Jul 2005

    Re: Yom Kippur 1973

    Di quel conflitto qualcosa ancora rimane...

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    Il campo di fango di Rovigo, coi pali delle porte più alti del mondo,fatti apposta per farti prendere paura. (Marco Paolini)

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